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Introduction  
And there, a dread sight even for Gods to see, was Cerberus…  
a hideous monster, warder of the Gate of Hades,  
Home of Wailing, jailer-hound of dead folk in the shadowy Gulf of Doom. 
—Quintus Smyrnaeus, Fall of Troy   
According to Greek legend, a vicious, three-headed beast known as Cerberus guarded the 
entrance to Hades. Cerberus kept the living out and the dead in at the gates to the Underworld.  
At the dawn of the 21st Century, Cerberus sleeps at the gates of the global media. All the while, 
terrorists pass their messages of influence against a mentally unguarded public. Terrorists 
influence the will of the people through the manipulation of terror, spread through the leverage of 
the global media. Lest the government turn to the beast of “censorship,” the media must 
voluntarily take on guardianship at the gates to the mind.  
Terrorism 
Like war, the nature of terrorism[1] is immutable—it is a deadly contest of wills, shrouded in horror, 
blood, hatred, friction, chaos, and uncertainty. While terrorism is still violence used for political 
purpose, its character is quite different from conventional war. It is governed by a different set of 
principles, where words and images ultimately prevail over bullets, where military forces are often 
intentionally avoided, where tactical success can result in strategic defeat, or contrarily, where 
tactical defeat can result in strategic success. Terrorism is more a war for the mind of non-
combatants than it is about the death and destruction of the participants. Consequently, it 
demands a markedly different strategy for defense. It requires an understanding of the complex 
interactions between the physical and mental realms of human perception.  
Two critical changes enable modern-day terrorists to achieve ends far beyond the relatively 
meager means available to them in terms of weaponry and manpower. The first is the increased 
lethality, deliverability, and availability of weaponry to terrorists. The second is the tremendous 
leverage that results from the synergy of coupling physical acts of violence with the mass media 
to achieve psychological impact against populations numbering orders of magnitude greater than 
the immediate participants.  
Although each will be discussed in turn, the major thrust of this paper is on defending against the 
larger, psychological impact of modern global terrorism. Finally, a case will be made for new type 
of citizen guardian—a “sentinel of the mind”—which must be trained and educated to conduct this 
critical function. 
The Real Weapon 
One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are 
the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.   
— Carl Von Clausewitz, On War 
In terms of lethality, a terrorist attack with a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a worst-case 
nightmare for any world leader. Technological refinements enable such weapons to be 
manufactured in ever-smaller packages, to the point where a single person can act as a delivery 
system. Offsetting the increased lethality and deliverability of such weapons is the tight control 
nation-states hold on them. Obviously, it is absolutely critical that such weapons remain scarce 
on the black market and unavailable to terrorists. On the other side of the spectrum are the widely 
available commercial products that can be modified for violent use. The innovative use of readily 
available civilian products in nefarious ways, such as aircraft as human-guided missiles, fertilizer 
bombs, or pesticides as chemical agents, can be just as effective as their military equivalents.  
The important features of a weapon go beyond its yield, however, to second order effects of 
weapons, through either detonation or threat. Whether weapons are sophisticated, high-tech, 
weapons of mass destruction or simple, low-tech terrorizing weapons of mass persuasion, the 
ultimate measure of effectiveness is the effect it has on the minds of the targeted population. 
Within this context, the cutting edge of the sword of terrorism is not the physical means of death 
and destruction—rather, it is terror brought on through vicarious threat, and that resides in the 
mind.  
Terror is the king of emotions, trumping all others when beckoned, mustering all bodily assets to 
deal with survival threats. In terms that Clausewitz would appreciate, the emotion of fear is the 
finely honed-blade. While world leaders may worry about lethality in terms of WMD, the thought of 
being at the wrong end of a blade as a beheading victim might be more terrorizing to an individual. 
Lethality must include a qualitative measure of terror intensity as well as a quantitative one. 
Weapons of mass destruction—nukes, gas, and bugs—provoke fear both in terms of the high 
number of deaths to a large population within an area of detonation, but also in the horrific nature 
of the pain and suffering associated with it.  
Beheadings, on the other hand, can instill as much fear in spite of the singular nature of each 
attack. These two extreme cases differ greatly in lethality, that is, the potential number of deaths 
they can achieve—the first can affect millions, while the second only one person at a time. But it 
is not only the horrifying nature of death that instills terror; it must also present at least some 
remote threat to the individual. 
Fear and Terror 
No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers  
of acting and reasoning as fear.  
—Edmund Burke  
Defined as “intense, overpowering fear,” terror is genetically hard-wired into our brains as a self-
survival mechanism against danger. It is the ultimate coercing lever when the object is to compel 
an enemy to do one’s will.[2] The key to understanding terrorism lies in understanding the 
psychological mechanisms through which fear-inducing weapons work on their targeted 
populations.  
A simplified diagram[3] of the fear process is shown in Figure 1. Sensory inputs are sent to the 
thalamus. From the thalamus the signal splits. First, unfiltered signals arrive directly at the 
amygdala. The amygdala, as the evolutionary and memory-induced warehouse of fear, makes a 
quick, rough, first order determination as to whether the signal is associated with danger. If so, it 
initiates a series of physiological responses that prepare the body to meet or avoid the threat. 
Meanwhile, the thalamus also forwards the same inputs to the sensory cortex, for a more 
deliberate and detailed evaluation. The cortically-processed sensory inputs then arrive at the 
amygdala (with a time detail relative to the direct inputs from the thalamus), either providing 
corroboration or invalidation of the threat.  
Figure 1: The Fear Process  
 
It is important to note that the evolutionarily developed mechanism of fear was, and in most cases, 
still is, completely appropriate for participants in, and direct observers of, danger. However, 
terrorists seek to elicit fear and terror not only from the physical victims of violence, but from a 
wider media audience, as well. In fact, it is the wider media audience that is the real target. In this 
sense, terror is principally an indirect means of coercion, in that physical acts of violence are 
orchestrated more for their strategic, psychological effect on an audience at large rather than the 
tactical, physical action against the victims themselves.[4] 
Terror and the Media 
Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of 
publicity on which they depend. 
— Margaret Thatcher  
There is ample evidence to conclude that television news about terrorism, more so than the print 
media, instills fear into viewers.[5] Media audiences vicariously share in danger through graphic 
images and accompanying stories of terror that prey on the crude, unfiltered, emotional pathway 
rather than the more reasoned, refined pathway that includes the sensory cortex, as is the case 
of the print media. This results from the way news is packaged for commercial purposes. 
Television news of terrorism is intentionally bundled in terms of fear in order to draw and maintain 
the attention of a maximum number of viewers.[6] Viewers see a hyped-up, fear-inducing story of 
terror, out of context of their own situational risk associated with the threat as a result of “framing.”  
Framing, or pre-persuasion, is one of the four stratagems of influence.[7] According to David L. 
Altheide, frames provide “the focus, a parameter or boundary, for discussing a particular event. 
Frames focus on what will be discussed, how it will be discussed, and, above all, how it will not 
be discussed.”[8] In terms of influence, persuasion, and propaganda, frames can serve a darker 
purpose, as evidenced in Dr. Kelton Rhoads’ definition of a frame as “a psychological device that 
offers a perspective and manipulates salience in order to influence subsequent judgment.”[9] 
Although terrorists and the media have decidedly different ends, they both depend upon frames 
to achieve them. While terrorists prefer a propagandist’s style of framing, the less malevolent 
media or “problem” frame, focused on gaining and maintaining viewer-ship, nonetheless suffices. 
Altheide suggests that selling news through problem framing has resulted in a “discourse of fear” 
between the news media, formal agents of social control, and the public, artificially raising 
perceptions of danger and risk beyond what is warranted. These periodic doses of improperly 
framed fear have resulted in an American society that is more anxious and fearful than any in its 
history, while at the same time experiencing a record level of life expectancy (77.3 years as of 
2002).[10]  
A proper contextual framing of terrorism would be to relate it to the overall level of risk audiences 
are subjected to in the course of their daily lives. For example, the terrorist acts on September 11, 
2001, resulted in 2, 926 certified deaths.[11] Almost six times more people were murdered in the 
United States—there were 17,382 homicides in 2001—than died during 9/11.[12] The 9/11 
terrorist attacks resulted in the formation of the Department of Homeland Security with an initial 
budget of $19.5 billion. In 2002, the number of U.S. citizens killed in terrorist attacks around the 
world decreased to 26—one one-hundredth of the previous year’s total. Yet, the FY 2003 
Department of Homeland Security budget increased to $37.7 billion, almost doubling in the 
course of a year.[13] The point here is not to diminish the threat of terrorism, particularly the 
devastating potential of WMD, but merely to put it into its appropriate context.  
For the viewer, perception is reality. Although the absence of relevant framing results in a 
perceived, rather than real, threat to the audience, it is enough to suit the needs of terrorists as an 
instrument of terrorism. As Thomas Schelling[14] points out: 
It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It 
is the latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or 
inflicted. The threat of pain tries to structure one’s motives, while brute force tries to overcome his 
strength. Whether it is sheer terroristic violence to induce an irrational response, or cool 
premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it and you may do it again, it is not 
the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior that matters. 
While the victims of terrorism suffer the violent blow, the audience is made to feel the threat  of 
more violence to come, if they do not yield to the demands of the terrorists. The physical targets 
of terrorists are general in that they symbolize, or are representative of, the observers—the 
adversary’s population or powerful institutions—but are random within that population to connect 
individuals and subgroups to the immediate victims. For example, if victims of the physical 
violence happen to be personnel in the Pentagon, then defense personnel within the larger 
military population may feel some measure of threat through identification, projection and 
association. Moreover, as the Pentagon is an icon of military power and defense, its impotence to 
thwart the attack plants doubt in the general population’s confidence in the military’s ability to 
defend them.  
Use of the media as an instrument of fear dissemination is problematic for terrorists, however. 
The media is a blunt, rather than precision delivery vehicle. Very different message objectives 
must be satisficed against multiple targets in the form of the four modern estates (the people, 
government, military, and media), further divided by whether they are supporting, neutral or the 
enemy. A notional targeting matrix, shown in Table 1, illustrates the difficulty terrorists face in 
accomplishing an act of violence against the enemy in the physical realm that subsequently 
meets their psychological objectives against such a diverse audience.  
Table 1: Terrorism Target Matrix 
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The media plays a large, if unintended, role in the transfer of direct, appropriate fear to indirect, 
potentially inappropriate fear. Although a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorists and the 
media, it is the media and not the terrorists who have the final say on what makes the news. 
There are minimum and maximum thresholds of violence, along with a host of other factors, 
which terrorist acts must meet to make the news. Not every terrorist act is considered 
newsworthy. On the other hand, some acts of terrorism are so heinous and grotesque that the 
media intentionally filters out harmful and tasteless stories and images from the public (such as 
beheadings in western culture). Concurrent with a terrorist’s intent to influence a population, the 
media has a related goal in that it must influence observers to pay attention in order to maintain 
market share that translates to commercial income.  
David Manning White provides a glimpse into who makes the final determination of whether a 
story is newsworthy or not. This decision-making function is known as “gatekeeping.” 
Gatekeepers are the decision-makers within news organizations who determine what is going to 
appear in the news and how it will appear. Gatekeepers may consist of a single editor or a series 
of key editors, and in some cases, may extend to an entire news organization.  
It is the functional role of gatekeepers to act as decisive figures and key powerbrokers in the 
news selection process.  
Journalists use an informal set of criteria established by an editorial hierarchy to select news. 
Galtung and Ruge[15] identified 12 factors, shown in Table 2, that gatekeepers informally use in 
their determination of newsworthiness. When terrorism is looked at through the prism of 
newsworthiness, the symbiotic relationship between terror and the media is clearly evident. 
Several of these criteria are particularly important not only to the newsworthiness of an act of 
terror, but also to the psychological effects that terrorists seek to achieve.  
Table 2: Key Factors in the Newsworthiness of Terrorism  
Newsworthiness Factor  Media Impact  Terrorism Relevance  
Frequency: the time span needed for 
the event to unfold itself and acquire 
The more similar the 
frequency of the event is to 
the frequency of the news 
Terror events must re-occur 
periodically to overcome the 
degradation of fear over time 
meaning.  
   
   
medium, the more probable 
that it will be recorded as 
news by that news medium.  
and to revisit the desired end 
state.  
Threshold: the level an event must 
pass to be recorded.  
· Amplitude: the magnitude of 
the event.  
An event must be of 
sufficient amplitude to be 
recorded.  
· The bigger the 
event, the bigger 
the headline.  
Terror events must meet a 
minimum threshold to be 
considered newsworthy.  
Clarity: one or a limited number of 
meanings in what is received.  
The more clear and less 
ambiguous the event, the 
more the event will be 
recorded.  
The clearer the act of 
violence and its reason, the 
more likely it will be 
recorded.  
Meaningfulness: some measure of 
ethnocentrism will be operative; there 
has to be cultural proximity and 
relevance.  
The more meaningful the 
event, the more likely it will 
be recorded as worth 
listening to.  
The greater the cultural 
proximity and relevance, the 
greater the fear.  
Consonance : the ‘expectation,’ 
cognitive interpretation in terms of 
what one ‘predicts’ and what one 
‘wants.’  
· More commonly understood 
today as “Cognitive 
Dissonance”—the 
psychological discomfort felt 
as a discrepancy between 
what one knows/believes, and 
new information.  
The more consonant the 
event is with the mental 
image of what one expects 
to find, the more probable it 
will be recorded as worth 
listening to.  
The more terrorists are able 
to disrupt current beliefs, the 
greater their chances of 
influencing opinion toward 
their cause and away from 
the status quo.  
   
   
Unexpectedness: events must be 
unexpected or rare, within the context 
of meaningfulness and consonance 
(above), to receive attention.  
The more unexpected the 
event, the more probable 
that it will be recorded as 
worth listening to.  
The greater the 
unpredictability, the greater 
the fear. Scarcity must be 
such that events aren’t 
“routine,” yet also meet 
frequency requirements.  
Continuity: the event has been 
covered and continues to be covered 
partly to justify its being covered in the 
first place, partly because of inertia in 
the system and partly because what 
was unexpected has now also 
become familiar.  
If an event has been 
previously recorded, it is 
more likely it will continue to 
be recorded, even if the 
amplitude is reduced.  
Subsequent acts of terror, 
even if they are of less 
magnitude, are more likely to 
be covered.  
Composition: changes in thresholds 
occur for new events in order to 
‘balance’ coverage.  
The more an even has been 
recorded, the more 
probable that a very 
different kind of event will 
be recorded the next time.  
High frequency acts of terror 
can achieve saturation, 
making it more likely other 
events will be covered.  
Elite nations: the actions of elite 
nations are more consequential than 
the activities of others.  
The more the event 
concerns elite nations, the 
more probable it will 
become a news item.  
Elite nations make better 
targets. The greater the 
nation, the more 
consequential the effect.  
Elite persons: the actions of elite 
persons are more consequential than 
the activities of others.  
The more the event 
concerns elite people, the 
more probable it will 
become a news item.  
The more elite the 
assassination victim, the 
greater the effect.  
Personification: news has a 
tendency to present events as 
sentences where there is a subject, a 
named person or collectively 
consisting of a persons, and the event 
is then seen as a consequence of this 
person or these persons.  
The more the event can be 
seen in personal terms, as 
due to the action of specific 
individuals, the more 
probable it will become a 
news item.  
The greater the 
personification, the greater 
the newsworthiness.  
Negativity: negative news will be 
preferred to positive news.  
The more negative the 
event in its consequences, 
the more probable it will 
become a news item.  
The more devastating the 
attack, the more likely it will 
be covered.  
While Galtung's and Ruge’s rubric only discusses lower thresholds, upper thresholds exist as well. 
As previously discussed, some images resulting from acts of terrorism may be so disturbing that 
journalists censor them on their own initiative. Renee and Brian Kratzer conducted a study of 
gatekeeper upper thresholds that resulted in self-censorship of disturbing images associated with 
the terrorist attack on 9/11.[16] They found that 16 of 20 newspapers with circulations greater 
than 75,000 chose not to publish disturbing pictures of people jumping to their deaths from the 
Twin Towers.  
It is important to note that a gatekeeper’s decision to select an event as newsworthy has 
tremendous implications—what may have been known previously by only a few will potentially be 
known by millions to billions. More importantly, it also has the potential to frighten and influence 
their attitudes and behavior. This tremendous power and leverage mark gatekeepers as the 
center of gravity[17] of the “terrorism” process. 
Cognitive Dissonance and Fear Appeals 
With most men, unbelief in one thing springs from blind belief in another.  
—Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799)  
Fear itself is only part of the psychological instrument of terrorism, however. While there may be 
some terrorists who derive some perverse pleasure from maintaining a society hostage to a state 
a fear, fear serves a larger purpose as a means to a political end. Fear is primarily the emotional 
attention-getter. Terrorists use fear as a sword aimed at one’s belief system as it relates to their 
political ends.  
Cognitive Dissonance is a psychological state of discomfort that results when a person’s belief 
system is conflicted. The aim of the terrorist is to induce enough fear and anxiety (resulting from 
the vicarious observation of acts of terrorism through the media) to cause people to question their 
own belief system in light of the terrorist’s demands. For example, if the political goal of the 
terrorist movement is to rid a region of Western presence, then the aim is to get a critical mass[18] 
of people to question whether that presence is necessary, given the new information of American 
lives lost as a result. 
Another psychological construct, the concept of fear appeal, also helps to explain how terrorism 
sometimes succeeds and oftentimes fails. A fear appeal is a persuasive message “designed to 
scare people by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the 
message recommends.”[19] It consists of two parts--a threat, or fear-inducing stimuli, and efficacy,  
the recommended response’s potential for threat reduction. People respond to fear appeals in 
one of two ways. They may focus on the threat in response to and in order to cope with their fear, 
known as fear control. Or, they may respond to the danger, referred to as danger control. Danger 
control processes are largely rational, cognitive evaluations of susceptibility to the threat, its 
severity, and one’s ability to carry out the recommended response. Fear control processes are 
principally emotional responses that oftentimes occur outside of conscious awareness. It is the 
perceived efficacy that determines whether danger control or fear control processes are initiated, 
while perceived threat determines the intensity of these responses.[20]  
The important point is that fear appeals that initiate the danger control process at a high level of 
perceived danger coupled to a high level of perceived efficacy normally result in high message 
acceptance—that is, conformance to the desired attitude or behavior.[21] This suggests that for 
the terrorist, there is a critical coupling requirement of the violent act to the psychological 
message. An understanding of the terrorist demand, that it can be affected, and that the violence 
is perceived as a real danger to the individual is necessary in order to maximize attitudinal and 
behavioral shifts that meet the terrorist group’s ends. However, when a person perceives that a 
serious threat cannot be prevented, either due to response ineffectiveness or an inability to 
perform the recommended action, then fear control processes dominate, often resulting in 
conscious or unconscious denial of the threat or reactance against the message. This suggests 
that a major psychological defense mechanism against terrorism is minimization of message 
efficacy, or in simpler terms, limited publication of terrorist demands in terms that an audience 
can affect.[22] In a free society, however, this is problematic, as the open media constitutes the 
instrument of message dissemination. 
Sentinels of the Mind 
There are but two powers in the world. The sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is 
always beaten by the mind. 
—Napoleon Bonaparte  
This raises the obvious question as to who has the responsibility to protect the people from the 
psychological element of a terrorist attack. As the preceding discussion showed, the media, not 
the government or military, are the ipso facto “sentinels of the mind” against global terrorism. This 
presents a perplexing problem for free, open societies on two counts. First, terrorism, as a tactic, 
can bypass a nation’s normal means of resistance (the military) altogether, instead, directly 
influencing the will of the populace through agents ill-trained and educated to function in that role. 
Second, a democratic government that honors freedom of speech as a fundamental right cannot 
censure the news without at least partially compromising the very right it seeks to protect.  
As mentioned previously, media gatekeepers are the center of gravity when it comes to global 
terrorism. They represent “the few” with control of information and images used to potentially 
influence the attitudes and behaviors of “the many.” It is suggested that educating gatekeepers, 
along with celebrities who might also become inadvertent dupes for terrorist messages, holds the 
greatest promise in defense against the larger, psychological sword of terrorism. Additionally, 
given the potential of the media as a “weapon of mass persuasion,” a form of the Hippocratic oath 
for journalists is also recommended.  
The government should focus on educating the public and the media, editors in particular, on the 
harmful effects of fear appeals. Simply avoiding the coupling of acts of terrorism with terrorist 
demands can minimize the amount of message acceptance. Secondly, the media should be 
aware of the connection between newsworthiness and its relevance to terrorism. Understanding 
terrorism from a newsworthiness perspective may cause journalists to pause in their mental 
calculus of whether the potential harm done to the nation outweighs a sensational story. If nothing 
else, it may influence the way they report a story, such as in the context of appropriate framing.  
Journalists bear a heavy responsibility to their constituents. They control a powerful instrument 
that, when used appropriately, informs a citizenry with accurate, reliable information needed to 
function in an open society. Journalists also act as a watchdog against oppression and a voice for 
the otherwise voiceless. But, the media can also be used as an instrument for malevolent 
purposes, whether intentional or inadvertent. Words and images can be used to hurt and 
manipulate people. In this sense, journalists should have a “Hippocratic” obligation to minimize 
harm.  
Journalistic standards of ethics, while not universal in their content, already exist in many areas of 
the media. While almost all journalistic standards include a responsibility to report truthfully and 
accurately, surprisingly few overtly list a responsibility to “minimize harm.” One such code of 
ethics that does, from the Society of Professional Journalists, is shown in Table 3.[23]  
Table 3: Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists 
Seek Truth and Report It 
Journalists should be honest, fair, and 
courageous in gathering, reporting, and 
interpreting information.  
Minimize Harm 
Ethical journalists treat sources, subjects, and 
colleagues as human beings deserving of 
respect.  
Act Independently 
Journalists should be free of obligation to any 
interest other than the public's right to know.  
Be Accountable 
Journalists are accountable to their readers, 
listeners, viewers, and each other.  
By minimizing harm, the Society includes the following guidance:  
· Show compassion for those who may be affected adversely by news coverage. Use 
special sensitivity when dealing with children and inexperienced sources or subjects.  
· Be sensitive when seeking or using interviews or photographs of those affected by 
tragedy or grief.  
· Recognize that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort. 
Pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance.  
· Recognize that private people have a greater right to control information about 
themselves than do public officials and others who seek power, influence or attention. 
Only an overriding public need can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy.  
· Show good taste. Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity.  
The government has a constitutional mandate to protect the people, but not necessarily at the 
expense of their fundamental rights as citizens. In the context of the psychological aspects of 
terrorism, the government is faced with the paradox of defending freedom through censorship. 
Given that American journalists are by and large rational, patriotic citizens in their own right, this 
paradox can be avoided altogether if journalists can be persuaded to self-censor psychologically 
damaging aspects of terrorism. They already self-censor grotesque, distasteful images as a 
matter of conscience and economics. When confronted with the potential damage done to the 
nation and its citizens, most will readily follow the “minimize harm” creed. For those that do not, 
an educated public along with an otherwise enlightened media, can provide feedback in several 
forms sure to get their attention. Public outrage and lost viewership, along with journalistic 
professional exposure as “dupes,” are powerful, self-regulating byproducts of an educated public 
and media.  
Within the spirit of minimizing harm and an acknowledgement of the media as a powerful 
instrument, a social obligation of journalists as a sort of new-age curator emerges. While the 
media doesn’t necessarily have the tools to mentally heal people, they have a role in preventing 
psychic harm as they alone guard access to global media.[24] In a sense, they act as a 
psychological prophylactic against damaging images and words. As societal guardians of the 
mind, the media maintains its non-combatant status, while still fulfilling its social contract to its 
constituents in reporting the news in a responsible fashion that minimizes harm. 
Conclusion  
It is wishful thinking of the worst kind to think that mere adherence to journalistic guidelines will 
make terrorism go away. Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest said it perfectly, “war 
means fightin’, and fightin’ means killin’.” Fundamentally, there is no substitute for violence in war 
as it is the very phenomenon that defines it.  
Hard-core, ideologically committed terrorists will not quit, and no amount of persuasion will 
change that. They simply have to be eliminated. The military and government agencies have 
largely done well to date in physically protecting the American people from the terrorists. They 
have built a layered defense consisting of counterterrorism (“rooting out” and killing hard-core 
terrorists far from American shores) and antiterrorism (making it hard for terrorists to enter 
America, hardening likely targets, and if they do gain entry, arresting them before they act) 
provisions.  
However, the military and government have not been as effective in avoiding counterterrorist 
action prone to psychological manipulation through propaganda. In the same fashion that violent 
images of terror against our own are used as a psychological instrument, so too are images of 
action against the terrorists themselves. Worse are images of collateral damage to women, 
children, and innocent bystanders. The “how” of counter-terrorism must always be looked at from 
the psychological potential of images used as propaganda, as well as the physical effectiveness 
of action against the terrorists.  
From an antiterrorism perspective, the people’s perception of physical protection is important, but 
once a terrorist attack is successful, the government and military are not in control of the means 
to psychologically protect the people. Whether one calls it spin-doctoring, counter-propaganda or 
information warfare, the government does not control the final output from the instrument of 
dissemination, the media. Nor are they capable of maintaining the tempo of modern-day 24/7 
global broadcasting. The government and the military in a free and open society are simply not 
equipped, nor is it advisable, for them to function in this role.  
Terrorism is a thinking man’s war that requires greater awareness and participation from the 
people—not just the military and government agencies. On the one hand, it is important to 
educate the people about terrorism so that they may be on the lookout for suspicious activity and 
on guard against falling prey to manipulation. On the other hand, the war against terrorism 
requires the addition of an altogether new class of defense—“sentinels of the mind”—to protect 
the means of mass persuasion against malevolent use by terrorists. It requires a knowledgeable 
media that understands the awesome power of their instrument and accepts responsibility for its 
effects. It places special responsibility on editors as gatekeepers to carefully weigh the necessity 
and benefit of accurate and truthful reporting against the harm it can achieve. These new 
guardians, willing or not, hold the key to guarding the public against terrorism. Awaken, Cerberus.  
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